Tax Planning Approaches Face Three Challenges: How the Business Context, Tax Planning Goals, and Tax Manager Power Affect Tax Expense

Authors

  • Himanshu Tomar

Keywords:

Tax planning, tax avoidance, manager power, qualitative research

Abstract

Some corporations pay more taxes than others, which is an extensively researched issue of interest. Tax avoidance is a well-known suspect rationale. Through 19 in-depth interviews with German tax experts, we establish a comprehensive scientific picture of impacts on company tax planning. Our findings imply that three major roadblocks in the tax strategic planning can account for variations in tax expense among businesses. These three obstacles determine which tax planning options are available. Desired in accordance with the objectives of tax planning, and adoptable according to the authority of the tax manager. This study explores the corporate governance role in long-run tax planning and adds to the existing knowledge in a number of ways. To begin, we provide insight into the horizon concerns associated with executive and director remuneration and demonstrate that incentive compensation offers lengthy incentive to boost efficiency by showing a correlation between higher compensation responsiveness and reduced taxes. They discover that effective incentives motivate managers to invest in longer-term pay outs like tax management. Furthermore, we discover that this expenditure in tax planning
helps stockholders; bigger tax administration is directly connected to greater shareholder dividends. Furthermore, tax administrators can wield varying degrees of power inside their firm, influencing their capacity to execute tax planning strategies. Finally, we present generalizable insights into corporate tax planning processes that assist to explain the observed heterogeneity in tax expenses between organizations.

 

Author Biography

Himanshu Tomar

 

 

References

Cooper M, Nguyen QT. Multinational enterprises and corporate tax planning: A review of

literature and suggestions for a future research agenda. International Business Review.

Jun 1;29(3):101692.

Graham JR, Hanlon M, Shevlin T, Shroff N. Incentives for tax planning and avoidance:

Evidence from the field. The Accounting Review. 2014 May;89(3):991-1023.

Mgammal MH. Corporate tax planning and corporate tax disclosure. Meditari

Accountancy Research. 2019 Oct 21;28(2):327-64.

Khaoula F, Moez D. The moderating effect of the board of directors on firm value and tax

planning: Evidence from European listed firms. Borsa Istanbul Review. 2019 Dec

;19(4):331-43.

Robinson JR, Sikes SA, Weaver CD. Performance measurement of corporate tax

departments. The Accounting Review. 2010 May;85(3):1035-64.

Klassen KJ, Lisowsky P, Mescall D. The role of auditors, non-auditors, and internal tax

departments in corporate tax aggressiveness. The Accounting Review. 2016 Jan;91(1):179-

Gribnau H, Jallai AG. Sustainable tax governance and transparency. InChallenges in

Managing Sustainable Business 2019 (pp. 337-369). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Bärsch SE, Heckemeyer JH, Olbert M. Transfer pricing and the decision-making authority

of the tax function in multinational companies. Available at SSRN 3271267. 2019 May 20.

Ang JS. On the theory of finance for privately held firms. The Journal of Entrepreneurial

Finance. 1992;1(3):185-203.

Gilson RJ, Schizer DM. Understanding venture capital structure: a tax explanation for

convertible preferred stock. Harvard Law Review. 2003 Jan 1;116(3):874-916.

Published

2023-02-04