REVISITING THE CONTROVERSIES ON THE JURISDICTIONOF NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA OVER LABOUR-RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS*
Keywords:
National Industrial Court, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010, fundamental rights, interpretation, application and enforcement, jurisdiction, authority, Supreme Court, judicial powers.Abstract
The advent of the Third Alteration Act ushered into the Nigerian corpus juris fundamental provisions which inter alia laid to rest the long jurisdictional debacle over the scope of the powers of the National Industrial Court (NIC) on labour-related human rights matters. By the said amendment, the National Industrial Court was empowered to entertain fundamental rights action arising from labour-related matters. However, despite this amendment certain limitations still persist which creates confusion for the courts and in some circumstances deprives genuine litigants the opportunity of having their genuine labour related fundamental rights cases ventilated before the before the NIC, which was meant to adjudicate on such subject matter. On the other hand, the applicability of the trail blazing Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules (FREP Rules) in proceedings commenced before the NIC has been perpetually faced with legal logjam despite predating the Third Alteration Act. The research employs an in-depth analysis of existing legal framework and decided cases in fundamental rights cases and attempts a rethinking of the existing framework over labor related fundamental rights action. The research question widely held views and grey areas thereto, in furtherance of making a case for the expansive and unlimited jurisdiction of the NIC over labour-related fundamental rights actions. Reliance will be placed on some decided cases from the apex court on the need to adopt an expansive interpretation of the Constitution on fundamental rights suit to meet the course of justice. To this end, this paper critically appraises the jurisdictional scope of the National Industrial Court in labour related fundamental rights issues with a view to proffer recommendations for reform.
References
1. Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009.
2. Section 46(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
3. The pivotal role of workers in an economy cannot be underestimated. See Egerton E. Uvieghara, Labour Law in Nigeria, (Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos: 2001), p1.
4. Section 46(1) of the Constitution provides that “Any person who alleges that any of NJLIL (2020) 32–44 © Law Journals 2020. All Rights Reserved Page 43 the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress”.
5. Ibid Section 254 (C)
6. Owners of the M. V. Arabella V. N.A.I.C (2008) 11 NWLR (PART 1097) 182. See also Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341
7. (2019) LPELR-46961(SC).
8. Ibid at Pp 15-16, paras G-H
9. Supra note 1, Order 1 Rule 2
10. (1985) LPELR-2940(SC)
11. Ibid at 33 -34, B-C. See also similar views by the following authors, Femi Falana, Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement in Nigeria, 2nd Ed, (Legal Text Publishing Company Limited, Lagos: 2010), 6; Chukwunono Daniel Ogbe, Enforce ment of Fundamental Rights in Nigerian Courts, 2nd Ed, (Chudanog Publishers Limited, Enugu:2017) p1; Frank Agbedo, Human Rights Litigation in Nigeria: Law, Practice and Procedure, Unilag Press Ltd, Lagos: 2016), 4,6; Fred F. Odibei, Cases and Materials on Human Rights Law, (Pearl Publishers, Port Harcourt, 2011), 5,6,7 and Yinka Olomojobi, Human Rights and Liberties in Nigeria Discussions, Analyses and Explanations, (Princeton & Associates Publishing Co. Ltd, Lagos:2016) 1,2.
12. Order 1(1) (b)
13. Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed, https://thelaw dictionary.org, last assessed 29/8/2019
14. Sections 6(6)a) and (b) of the Constitution.
15. Ibid Constitution
16. In this work, I shall be addressing the question whether a limitation was intended by the wordings of Section 254C by the drafters of the Constitution
17. (2004) 10 NWLR PART 880 PAGE 107
18. (2019) LPELR-46941(CA) p11, para B-D
19. Senior Staff Association of Universities’ Teaching Hospitals Research Institutes and Associated Institutions v. OLOTU (no 2.) (2016)14 NWLR (Pt 1531) 8 at 18, paras G -H. See also Ayabam v. Benue State Government &Ors (2016) 64NLLR 438 at pages 469 – 471.
20. Ibid (n 2), Order 1 Rule 2 defined ‘court’ to mean “the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja”.
21. Ibid (n 1) Section 6(1)(2)(3) and ( 5) cc ; Section 254C (1)d)
22. Ibid (n 1) Section 46(2)
23. See Ajomale v. Yaduat& Anor [1991] LPELR-305(SC) para G -B, pp 8 -9 per Karibi-Whyte, JSC
24. See Comrade (Evang.) OlowoPreye Grace v. PENGASSAN & 3 ors unreported Suit No. NIC/EN/10/2011 delivered on July 5, 2011 per Justice B.B kanyip and Alhaji Lateef Akinsola v. NURTW &ors [2013] 33 NLLR (Pt. 96) 399.
25. Op cit at page 18
26. Ibid (n 1), Section 1(3). The provisions of Section 6(1), (2)(3), (5) cc and 254C (1)d of the Constitution is not subject to Order 2 of the FREP Rules.
27. Ibid Section 6(1 ), ( 2)(3), (5)cc and 254C(1)d
28. That is IF the exclusion was to be justified by law but in this circumstance, there is no basis in law and logic for such needless exclusion as shall be seen later in this discourse.
29. The present author argues that though it appears literally that the word enforcement was absent in S. 254C(1)d of the constitution that it does not represent the position of the law to assert that by such, the NIC cannot entertain an action for enforcement of labour-related fundamental rights.
30. Going by this generally held view, the position would not have changed IF the form of complaint under the NIC was used to commence an action for enforcement of the fundamental rights at the NIC, as the red flag is centered on the term enforcement. The point is that even if the action was commenced vide FREP Rules for enforcement of the rights, it would still have been faulted under the NIC.
31. It will neither run contrary to the long title nor objective of the FREP Rules.
32. See Sections 251, 255 and 270 of the Constitution.
33. (2016) 65 NILR (Pt. 232) 613.
34. Ibid at 649, paras E-F NJLIL (2020) 32–44 © Law Journals 2020. All Rights Reserved Page 44
35. Similarly, it would be turning logic on its head to argue that Federal Capital Territory High Court was equally excluded from the provision of Section 46 because the provision only referred to “a High Court in that State” as opposed to Federal Capital Territory High Co urt. Also, it would illogical to state that the word ‘Federal’ was clearly missing in the said provision and cannot now be read to mean “a High Court in that State”, Federal High Court been a court for the federation with merely different divisions and not a state court.
36. Reliance cannot be placed on the definition of a ‘court’ as offered by Order 2 of FREP Rules to resolve this debacle as the FREP Rules cannot be used to limit powers denoted by the Constitution.
37. See also Section 6(3) of the Constitution.
38. Section 46(2) of the Constitution was made subject to the Constitution, inclusive of Section 254C (1).
39. Inferior courts are courts under Section 6(5) not designated by the Constitution as superior courts.
40. Aturu, Nigerian Labour Laws, Principles, Cases, Co mmentaries and Materials (Lagos: Triedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005) p. 237
41. The High Court of the various States of the Federation, Federal High Court and the Federal Capital Territory High Court are divested the jurisdiction to adjudicated on labour-related f undamental rights action which seek only interpretation and application as opposed to fundamental rights action which seek enforcement remedies. How this fine distinction plays out is to date marred in controversies as would be examined at the tail of this work.
42. National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. It must be pointed out that the manner Or 3 R 2(2)b of the NIC Rules is couched, it is doubtful if genuine cases of fundamental rights requiring the said interpretation and application can be granted the desired urgency being that a complaint would entail filing of written statement on oath which would be adopted at the hearing in the witness box as opposed to affidavit evidence that usually fits extreme emergency in human rights suit commenced vide motion on notice or originating motion on notice.
43. The last review was made in 2009
44. (2018) LPELR-46151(CA).
45. Ibid page 23, para F
46. This entitles the Applicant to lead oral evidence on his claims
47. Suit No: NICN/LA/72/17 – ESIRI v. Guinness Nig. Plc ( unreported) delivered on 22/11/18 per His Lordship E. An Oji
48. Order 1 Rule 9(2) which provides that “These Rules are to be applied by the Court as it considers fit…”
49. Prof Chioma kanu Agomo, Nigerian Employment and Labour Relations Law and Practice, (Concept Publications Limited, Lagos: 2011), p341
50. (2015) LPELR-25987(SC) at P. 63, Paras. C-E
51. Compare the view of His Lordship B.B Kanyip J in suit no: NICN/ LA/ 173/2017 - Manasse V. Sterling Bank Plc (unreported), delivered 16th February 2018 at Lagos division where the court stated “that one cannot file under the said Rules does not mean one has no remedy. The remedy can be accessed through other processes such as the writ of summons or complaint”. With due respect, it is opined that the nature of fundamental rights being sui generis in nature and most times requiring to be treated with urgency, the perceived error in the form used in the commencement should never be allowed to becloud the substance of the suit, which is for the preservation of the rights.
52. (2003) LPELR-3173 (SC) Cite this Article Damiari Temple Michael . Revisiting the Controversies on the Jurisdiction of National Industrial Court of Nigeria over Labour-related Human Rights Matters . Law. June 2020; 3(1): 32–44p.
