Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets: An Analytical Study of the Competition Commission of India’s Approach

Abstract

The speedy expansion of India’s digital market has raised many concerns about the adequacy of competition law to deal with the abuse of dominance by large digital platforms. Traditional law, which used to deal with the abuse of dominance that lies under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 , developed for conventional markets, often struggles to account for the distinctive features of digital markets, including network effects, data accumulation, multi-sided platforms, and non-price competition.  This paper helps us examine how the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has explained and applied rules and regulations to prohibit abuse of dominance in the digital market. By analyzing the recent cases and decisions of CCI regarding major digital
platforms, supported by a comparative analysis of global competition regimes, the study evaluates whether the CCI has effectively transitioned from a formalistic approach toward an effects-based analytical framework.  The paper research helps us find that although the CCI has increasingly recognized the rapid rise in data-driven market power and user dependence, its
use of effects-based reasoning is still inadequate and uneven. In particular, the absence of clearly articulated standards for assessing data dominance and non-price consumer harm has resulted inuneven enforcement and regulatory uncertainty.  The paper helps us understand that a more reasonable, transparent, and evidence-based framework is required by CCI, supported by targeted regulatory guidance, to ensure effective ways to control the abusive conduct of big companies in India’s digital markets while promoting innovation and consumer welfare.