Anti-dumping Agreement and Agreement on Safeguards: An Analysis
Keywords:
Anti-Dumping Agreement, Agreement on Safeguards, GATT 1947, GATT 1994, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article XIX of GATT, 1947Abstract
There are multitudinous agreements between various member nations and/or signatories under the regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which endeavors to ensure free and fair trade across numerous geographical borders. With advancements in technology, there have been strides in the realm of trade in terms of both volume and quality. The WTO, as an embodiment of one of the major players in the field of world trade, has undertaken to cover all and many aspects of the field of trade. This finding stresses the importance of free trade without any discrimination. This study primarily examines two similar agreements under the WTO framework: the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Safeguards.
References
World Trade Organization. The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/adp_e.htm.
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The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/adp_e.htm.
Ibid.
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World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 5 Initiation and Subsequent Investigation - 5.8 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. There shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible. The margin of dumping shall be considered to be de minimis if this margin is less than 2 percent, expressed as a percentage of the export price. The volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded as negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for less than 3 percent of imports of the like product in the importing Member, unless countries which individually account for less than 3 percent of the imports of the like product in the importing Member collectively account for more than 7 percent of imports of the like product in the importing Member. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ adp_e.htm#art5.
Ibid.
Ibid.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 9 Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties 9.1 The decision whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the amount of the anti-dumping duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_02_e.htm.
Supra 10.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 9 Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/ english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_02_e.htm.
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World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 8 Price Undertakings. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 7 Provisional Measures. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 7 Provisional Measures - 7.1 Provisional measures may be applied only if: (i) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, a public notice has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments; (ii) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry; and (iii) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 7 Provisional Measures - 7.2 Provisional measures may take the form of a provisional duty or, preferably, a security - by cash deposit or bond - equal to the amount of the anti-dumping duty provisionally estimated, being not greater than the provisionally estimated margin of dumping. Withholding of appraisement is an appropriate provisional measure, provided that the normal duty and the estimated amount of the anti-dumping duty be indicated and as long as the withholding of appraisement is subject to the same conditions as other provisional measures. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www. wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
Ibid.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 7 Provisional Measures - 7.3 Provisional measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the investigation. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs _e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 11 Duration and Review of Anti-Dumping Duties and Price Undertakings - 11.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive anti-dumping duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the most recent review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered both dumping and injury, or under this paragraph), unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. The duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_02_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. WTO Analytical Index: Anti-dumping Agreement – Article 11 (DS Reports). Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization; 1994. Available from: https://www. wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/anti_dumping_art11_jur.pdf.
Supra 15.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 8 Price Undertakings - 8.1 Proceedings may be suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional measures or anti-dumping duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so that the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated. Price increases under such undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to eliminate the margin of dumping. It is desirable that the price increases be less than the margin of dumping if such increases would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto. org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 8 Price Undertakings - 8.2 Price Undertakings shall not be sought or accepted from exporters unless the authorities of the importing Member have made a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and injury caused by such dumping. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
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World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 5 Initiation and Subsequent Investigation - 5.10 Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their initiation. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 5 Initiation and Subsequent Investigation - 5.1 Except as provided for in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the existence, degree, and effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www. wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 5 Initiation and Subsequent Investigation - 5.4 An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the authorities have determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to, the application expressed by domestic producers of the like product, that the application has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. The application shall be considered to have been made “by or on behalf of the domestic industry” if it is supported by those domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 percent of the total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 percent of the total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 5 Initiation and Subsequent Investigation - 5.6 If, in special circumstances, the authorities concerned decide to initiate an investigation without having received a written application by or on behalf of a domestic industry for the initiation of such investigation, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the initiation of an investigation. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 3 Determination of Injury [9] (Note 9 to Article 3) - Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 3 Determination of Injury - 3.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 4 Definition of Domestic Industry - 4.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products, except that: (i) when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, the term “domestic industry” may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers; (ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for the production in question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory. In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration of dumped imports into such an isolated market and provided further that the dumped imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such market. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Part I: Article 3 Determination of Injury - 3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors that may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry
. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm.
Ibid.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Part II: Article 17 Consultation and Dispute Settlement - 17.4 If the Member that requested consultations considers that the consultations pursuant to paragraph 3 have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and if final action has been taken by the administering authorities of the importing Member to levy definitive anti-dumping duties or to accept Price Undertakings, it may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). When a provisional measure has a significant impact and the Member that requested consultations considers that the measure was taken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7, that Member may also refer such matter to the DSB. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_02_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Part II: Article 17 Consultation and Dispute Settlement - 17.1 Except as otherwise provided herein, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_02_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm; World Trade Organization, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947). Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto. org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm.
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World Trade Organization. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XIX: Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products 1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. (b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession, in respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury. 2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the Contracting Parties as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the Contracting Parties and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action. 3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, befree to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be
free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received by the Contracting Parties, the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the Contracting Parties do not disapprove. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm. Refer General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 2: Conditions - 1. A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm.
Supra 39 at 147.
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World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 4: Determination of Serious Injury or Threat Thereof - 1. For the purposes of this Agreement: (a) “serious injury” shall be understood to mean a significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic industry. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#4.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 4: Determination of Serious Injury or Threat Thereof - 1. For the purposes of this Agreement: (b) “threat of serious injury” shall be understood to mean serious injury that is clearly imminent, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2. A determination of the existence of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture, or remote possibility. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#4.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 4: Determination of Serious Injury or Threat Thereof - 1. For the purposes of this Agreement: (c) in determining injury or threat thereof, a “domestic industry” shall be understood to mean the producers as a whole of the like or directly competitive products operating within the territory of a Member, or those whose collective output of the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#4.
Gupta RK. (2014). Safeguard measures. [Online]. Bangkok, Thailand: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Available from: https://www.unescap.org/ sites/default/files/Safeguard%20Measures.pdf.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Training Module on the WTO Agreement on Anti-dumping. New York and Geneva: United Nations; 2006. Available from: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditctncd20046_en.pdf.
Supra 41.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 6: Provisional Safeguard Measures - In critical circumstances where delay would cause damage that would be difficult to repair, a Member may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a preliminary determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury. The duration of the provisional measure shall not exceed 200 days, during which period the pertinent requirements of Articles 2 through 7 and 12 shall be met. Such measures should take the form of tariff increases to be promptly refunded if the subsequent investigation referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 4 does not determine that increased imports have caused or threatened to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. The duration of any such provisional measure shall be counted as a part of the initial period and any extension referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 7. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 5: Application of Safeguard Measures - 1. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. If a quantitative restriction is used, such a measure shall not reduce the quantity of imports below the level of a recent period which shall be the average of imports in the last three representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury. Members should choose measures most suitable for the achievement of these objectives. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 4: Determination of Serious Injury or Threat Thereof - 2 (b) The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) shall not be made unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#4.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 7: Duration and Review of Safeguard Measures - 1. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. The period shall not exceed four years unless it is extended under paragraph 2. 2. The period mentioned in paragraph 1 may be extended provided that the competent authorities of the importing Member have determined, in conformity with the procedures set out in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5, that the safeguard measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and that there is evidence that the industry is adjusting, and provided that the pertinent provisions of Articles 8 and 12 are observed. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 7: Duration and Review of Safeguard Measures - 3. The total period of application of a safeguard measure including the period of application of any provisional measure, the period of initial application, and any extension thereof, shall not exceed eight years. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 7: Duration and Review of Safeguard Measures - 4. In order to facilitate adjustment in a situation where the expected duration of a safeguard measure as notified under the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 12 is over one year, the Member applying the measure shall progressively liberalize it at regular intervals during the period of application. If the duration of the measure exceeds three years, the Member applying such a measure shall review the situation not later than the mid-term of the measure and, if appropriate, withdraw it or increase the pace of liberalization. A measure extended under paragraph 2 shall not be more restrictive than it was at the end of the initial period and should continue to be liberalized. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from:
https://www.wto.org/ english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#4.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 10: Pre-existing Article XIX Measures - Members shall terminate all safeguard measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of GATT 1947 that were in existence on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement not later than eight years after the date on which they were first applied or five years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, whichever comes later. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm.
World Trade Organization. Agreement on Safeguards, Article 14: Dispute Settlement - The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes arising under this Agreement. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. 1994. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm.
