TRADING SOVEREIGNTY FOR TRANSPARENCY IN THE OIL INDUSTRY IN CAMEROON: IS EITI ABOVE THE LAW?
Keywords:
TRADING, SOVEREIGNTY, TRANSPARENCY, OIL INDUSTRY, EITI.Abstract
One of the striking features of modern globalization is the rising prominence of
multi-stakeholder organizations in international economic relations. This rising prominence can be attributed to the quest by States for recognition by international donor institution. Cameroon’s adherence to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiativeould safely be attributed to this motive. The EITI is an initiative whose main objective is to promote transparency and accountability in the extractive industry’s resources management. EITI’s main objective when it was first created was to tackle the intractable problem known as the “resource curse”, by encouraging resource-rich but governance-poor developing countries such as Cameroon, to create domestic systems to improve transparency and social participation in their natural resource sectors. Only resource-rich developing countries were expected to implement EITI, while all other stakeholders –including developed countries –were expected to support the initiative and participate in compliance verification. This article seeks to find out whether by adhering to this initiative, the government has abandoned her sovereign right of governance in favour of collective governance so as to achieve transparency. After examining the concept of State sovereignty and the importance of transparency in the management of oil revenue in Cameroon, this article concludes that adherence to the EITI is merely a smokescreen not intended to affect the sovereign right of governance in any way.
References
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2. Bernard Gauthier and Albert Zeufack, (2009), Revenue Watch Project, OxCARRE, Oxford University.
3. See the Preamble of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon.
4. Cossé, S. (2006) . Strengthening Transparency in the Oil Sector in Cameroon: Why Does it Matter? IMF policy discussion paper 06/02, IMF, Washington, DC.
5. Benjamin and Devarajan (1986) support the view that they were deposited outside the Cameroonian banking system. In particular, despite Cameroon’s obligation by membership in the Central Africa n Currency Union (Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale) to keep its official reserves in the Bank of France, the Government of Cameroon was reportedly accumulating sizable foreign exchange outside the Bank of France, probably in US banks.
6. Albert Zeufack, fn, 2
7. Ibid. JCGIBL (2019) 44-56 © Law Journals 2019. All Rights Reserved Page 55
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9. World Bank Report, 1987, p.32
10. Albert Zeufack, fn 2 supra
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12. Benjamin et al., 1989. Furthermore, authors such as Jua (1993) believed that the secrecy wa s a scam by the authorities to hide misappropriation of funds. Also, despite official appearance of oil revenues transfers in the finance laws starting in 1988, van de Walle (1994, p. 141) posited the existence of important secret oil accounts controlled by the President.
13. IMF, 2000, p. 16
14. See Albert Zeufack, note 2.
15. The HIPC program is designed in such a way that it requires changes in policy before disbursements are made.
16. Albert Zeufack, note 2.
17. Ibid. note 2
18. IMF, 2000. p. 23
19. See Albert Zeufack, note 2.
20. IMF, 2000, p. 21.
21. Albert Zeufack note 2.
22. Bernard Gauthier and Albert Zeufack, 2009, Governance and Oil Revenues in Cameroon. Revenue Watch Project, OxCARRE, Oxford University. See specifically the Appendix.
23. See Global Witness, Global Witness Statement to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (June 2003), at http:// www.globalwitness.org/reports/sho w.php/en.00043.html. (Last visited on April 13th, 2018).
24. See Publish What You Pay, Publish What You Pay, at http:// www. publishwhatyoupay.org (last visited April 13, 2018).
25. See Press Release, Bank, Fund Fail the Test over Missing Oil Billions (Sept. 19, 2003), at http://www.globalwitness. org/press_releases/display2.php?id=217. such countries include Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guine a, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
26. See Frank Garriba, How Transparent is Oil Management in Cameroon? Available at http://edennewspaper.net/index.php? (last visited on April 13, 2018).
27. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002, 566 -68 (discussing IMF efforts to promote oil revenue transparency and address corruption in Angola), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/pdf/business.pdf.
28. See Howard Carter, CEO, ISIS Asset Management, Address at the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) London Conference (June 17, 2003) (transcript available at http://www. dfid.gov.uk/news/news/files/eiti_draft_ report_isis.htmtop). ISIS is a $100 billion asset management company that uses corporate governance and corporate social responsibility measures and engagement across its entire portfolio. It was one of the first institutional investors to support the Publish What You Pay Campaign. Ultimately, ISIS spoke in support of the EITI on behalf of institutional investors from the U.K., United States, Continental Europe, and Canada who, together with ISIS, manage about $3 trillion of client funds.
29. Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and soft law in the Oil and Gas Industry, (2004), 36 N. Y. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 457.
30. See http:// www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/f iles/eiti_guide_b.pdf (last visited April 12, 2018).
31. See Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions, § II (June 17, 2003), at JCGIBL (2019) 44-56 © Law Journals 2019. All Rights Reserved Page 56 http:// www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/eitidraf treportstatement.pdf (last visited April 12, 2018).
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33. Prime Ministerial Decree No. 2005/2176/PM of June 16, 2005. See also Ministerial Decision No. 002328/ MINEFI/CAB of September 15, 2005, which created The Monitoring Committee Technical Secretariat.
34. Least Developed Countries Report 2011.
35. Afghanistan, Chad, Guinea, Sao Tome and Prince. See EITI website at http://eiti.org/ countries. Candidate countries are those that meet four sign-up criteria but have yet to go through the external “validation” process that assesses whether EITI standards have been complied with. After validation countries are declared “compliant’ but need to undergo new validations periodically to maintain this status.
36. Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Yemen and Zambia are compliant countries.
37. Central African Republic, DRC, and Sierra Leone. The only resource rich LDCs that do not participate in EITI are Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe and Sudan.
38. Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Albania ,, Cameroon, Cote Ivoire Gabon, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Republic of Congo, Togo, Guatemala, etc.
39. Paul Collier, 2007. See also Moran, Graham, & Blomstrom, 2001.
40. Eigen, 2006.
41. Gillies and Heuty, (2011), Does Transparency Work? The Challenges of Measurement and Effectiveness in Resource Rich Countries, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 6, Issue2 Cite this Article Mbifi Richard . Trading Sovereignty for Transparency in The Oil I ndustry in Cameroon: Is Eiti Above the Law? Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law . July 2019; 2(1): 44–56p.
