Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law
https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/jcgibl
<p>Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law is a peer reviewed Journal. In a broad sense, corporate governance is about how firms should be governed so that they run effectively and efficiently. This Journal takes a broad perspective on corporate governance mechanisms and considers possible synergies between corporate governance and international business (IB) research.</p>Consortium E- Learning Network Pvt. Limiteden-USJournal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law2584-1327Legal Issues for Chinese Investment in India
https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/jcgibl/article/view/2058
<p>With the deep integration of the global economy, India’s market-oriented reforms have advanced steadily, accompanied by the implementation of a series of foreign direct investment (FDI) incentive policies, which has greatly boosted the enthusiasm of Chinese enterprises to invest in India. As two major developing economies with complementary industrial structures, China and India have broad prospects for economic and trade cooperation, yet Chinese enterprises still face multiple challenges in their investment and operation in India. This paper systematically investigates the practical difficulties in legal environment, tax system, policy continuity and cross-cultural integration. On this basis, the paper puts forward targeted legal suggestions and operational strategies for Chinese enterprises to achieve sustainable development in India, from the perspectives of abiding by local laws, realizing localized operation, strengthening risk prevention and control, and integrating industrial resources. It is concluded that Chinese enterprises must take legal compliance as the core, adapt to India’s local cultural and institutional characteristics, and cooperate with the government’s bilateral communication mechanism to grasp the development opportunities under the complementary advantages of China-India industries, so as to promote the win-win development of bilateral economic and trade cooperation.</p>Chen Junke
Copyright (c) 2026 Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law
2026-05-012026-05-0192Corporate Social Responsibility and Law in the Post-Pandemic Global Landscape
https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/jcgibl/article/view/2041
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic exposed fundamental vulnerabilities in the global economic order and prompted a widespread reassessment of corporations’ roles and responsibilities in society. This article examines the evolving conceptual and legal framework of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the post-pandemic global economy. It argues that the pandemic has catalysed a paradigm shift from voluntary, philanthropic models of CSR toward more robust, legally mandated frameworks that hold corporations accountable for their social and environmental impacts. Drawing upon stakeholder theory, international soft law instruments, and comparative legal analysis, this paper evaluates the adequacy of existing CSR frameworks in addressing the systemic inequalities exacerbated by the pandemic. The analysis encompasses the European Union&#39;s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, India&#39;s mandatory CSR provisions under Section 135 of the Companies Act 2013, and emerging standards under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The article concludes that a post-pandemic CSR paradigm must integrate human rights due diligence, supply chain accountability, and stakeholder inclusivity to ensure that corporate conduct aligns with the imperatives of sustainable development and social justice.</p>Swarnima Gorani Bhupinder Singh
Copyright (c) 2026 Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law
2026-04-122026-04-1292A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process) Regulations, 2026
https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/jcgibl/article/view/2091
<p>The proposed Regulations governing the Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process, 2026, constitute a pivotal advancement in India’s insolvency architecture, transitioning the commencement of proceedings from a court-dominated paradigm to a creditor-led modality. Devised to counter the delays, asset value diminution, and procedural bottlenecks inherent in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the CIIRP regime aims to promote timely intervention, compress resolution durations, and augment macroeconomic efficiency. Nonetheless, this paradigm shift engenders profound concerns pertaining to the safeguarding<br>due process, the ambit of judicial scrutiny, and the equilibrium of influence between creditors and corporate debtors. Specifically, the Regulations delineate a framework that empowers creditors to initiate resolution proceedings (Parakkott, 2024), fundamentally altering the traditional &quot;debtor-in-possession&quot; model to one where creditors exert greater control (Bose et al., 2020) . This article presents a thorough and critical evaluation of the CIIRP framework, positioning it amid the expansive development of India’s insolvency system and its progression to a creditor-dominated paradigm. Although the IBC has substantially elevated recovery rates (Bose et al., 2020) and fortified creditor entitlements (Kosuri et al., 2026) , it has concurrently resulted in managerial displacement (Deb &amp; Dube, 2020) . The prospective CIIRP regulations further this progression by amplifying the authority of financial creditors, thereby compelling a more incisive interrogation of their ramifications for equity,<br>responsibility, and systemic integrity. This paper will critically examine whether the CIIRP Regulations adequately address the intricate balance between creditor empowerment and the protection of other stakeholders, particularly given the historical context of India&#39;s corporate insolvency framework evolving from a manager-driven to a manager-displacing model (Deb<br>&amp; Dube, 2020) . This analysis delineates several structural and procedural shortcomings in the proposed framework. These encompass the attenuation of judicial oversight during the initiation phase (Bork, 2021; Payne &amp; Sarra, 2017) , which engenders apprehensions of arbitrariness and contravention of natural justice principles (Iheme, 2020; Weijs et al., 2019) ; the heightened creditor dominance through diminished voting thresholds (Stef, 2016) , (Weijs et al., 2019) , potentially fostering strategic or coercive invocation of insolvency proceedings (Eidenmüller &amp; Zwieten, 2015) ; and the paucity of protections for corporate debtors (Deakin et al., 2016; Iheme, 2020) , particularly amid the substantial reputational and commercial repercussions<br>precipitated by commencement (Cepec &amp; Kovač, 2016) . Further apprehensions stem from the non-mandatory moratorium (Bork, 2021; Eidenmüller &amp; Zwieten, 2015) , ambiguities in the debtor-in-possession paradigm (Deakin et al., 2016; Iheme, 2020) , and uncertainties surrounding the Resolution Professional&#39;s independence and accountability (GUPTA, 2019; Joshi, 2025) . These issues collectively necessitate a comprehensive reassessment of the Regulations to ensure equitable stakeholder treatment and robust procedural safeguards within the evolving creditor-centric insolvency framework (Eidenmüller &amp; Zwieten, 2015) . Moreover, the invocation of prevailing CIRP provisions mutatis mutandis precipitates regulatory redundancies and interpretive ambiguities, particularly in light of the disparate architectures underpinning the two regimes. The concurrent availability of CIIRP alongside alternative pathways, such as the Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process, further engenders vulnerabilities to forum shopping and uneven enforcement. Pragmatically, the stringent timelines, institutional capacity limitations, and paucity of granular procedural safeguards for challenging resolution plans are liable to obstruct efficacious implementation and dissuade stakeholder involvement. This situation is further exacerbated by the challenges of mobilizing interim financing in a creditor-oriented bankruptcy regime, which can impact the successful outcome of the resolution process (Baxi, 2023) . Leveraging comparative analyses and extant scholarship, this article contends that although the CIIRP framework advances legitimate aims of efficiency and value maximization, it may intensify extant challenges in India’s insolvency regime without meticulous calibration. Notably, the paucity of robust safeguards and oversight mechanisms could enable opportunistic conduct by astute financial creditors, thereby eroding the principle of equitable stakeholder treatment (Eidenmüller &amp; Zwieten, 2015) . Moreover, challenges in effectively mobilizing interim finance, despite existing priority provisions, heighten concerns over the feasibility of rehabilitation for distressed yet viable enterprises (Baxi, 2023; Puchakayala &amp; Veluchamy, 2023) . The success of the CIIRP framework will ultimately hinge on its capacity to equilibrate efficiency with equity, creditor prerogatives with debtor safeguards, and reformist innovation with foundational insolvency principles. To realize this potential, the framework requires robust procedural protections, precise institutional demarcations, and fortified transparency and accountability protocols, thereby bolstering the enduring resilience and legitimacy of India’s insolvency architecture.</p>Mohit Jolly
Copyright (c) 2026 Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law
2026-05-292026-05-299210.37591/jcgibl.v9i2.2091Exploring the relationship between Earnings Management and Corporate Social Responsibility in India
https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/jcgibl/article/view/2060
<p>This study looks at how <strong>Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)</strong> is related to <strong>Earnings Management (EM)</strong>, which means how companies may manipulate their financial results. Many past studies have tried to examine this relationship, but their results are often <strong>confusing and contradictory</strong>.</p> <p>The main reason for these mixed results is that <strong>researchers measure CSR and earnings management in different ways</strong>. Between <strong>2008 and 2016</strong>, this article reviewed existing studies to understand these measurement methods better.</p> <p>The study found that:</p> <ul> <li>CSR is measured using tools like <strong>sustainability indexes</strong>, <strong>analysis of company reports</strong>, or <strong>single indicators</strong>.</li> <li>Earnings management is measured using methods such as <strong>discretionary accruals</strong>, <strong>real earnings management</strong>, <strong>earnings smoothing</strong>, and <strong>earnings persistence</strong>.</li> </ul> <p>Each method has its <strong>own limitations</strong>, and researchers’ <strong>personal judgment and choice of data</strong> can affect the results. Because of this, the relationship between CSR and earnings management may appear positive in some studies and negative in others. In the end, the article suggests better and more consistent measurement methods to reduce bias and improve the accuracy of future research.</p>Malobika BoseManashvi Purwar
Copyright (c) 2026 Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law
2026-05-012026-05-0192ENFORCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN INDIA- JUDICIAL INTERVENTION, VALUATION CONFLICTS AND THE EMERGING DEADLOCK IN CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/jcgibl/article/view/2042
<p>This paper examines the evolving role of Indian courts in investor-state dispute settlement, tracing India’s shift from a pro-arbitration posture to strategic judicial intervention. It argues that the enforcement of BIT awards is impeded by doctrinal uncertainty over jurisdiction, admissibility and the commercial character of treaty claims, as well as by the expanding use<br>of anti-arbitration injunctions and the Group of Companies doctrine to curb forum competition and vertical multiplicity. The paper further identifies a persistent compensation schism between international standards of full reparation, including fair market value and discounted cash flow valuation and India’s restrictive domestic valuation and repatriation regime under FEMA, RBI guidelines and SEBI-related controls. These inconsistencies, compounded by India’s non-membership in the ICSID Convention and divergent judicial treatment of foreign awards, generate an enforceability deadlock that undermines investor confidence and treaty credibility. The paper uses doctrinal analysis supported by secondary empirical material and evaluates leading Indian and foreign decisions and argues for institutional recalibration. It concludes that India requires a standalone investment dispute framework, specialized judicial benches, harmonized valuation standards and regulatory exceptions for treaty-based awards to align domestic law with international best practices, to restore predictability, reduce delay and preserve the efficacy of investor protection commitments.</p>Somardh AgrawalAkankshi Asthana
Copyright (c) 2026 Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law
2026-04-122026-04-1292The Black Box Problem: Rethinking Corporate Disclosure and Transparency in the Age of AI-Driven Governance
https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/jcgibl/article/view/2090
<p style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph; line-height: 150%;">The rapid integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into corporate governance frameworks has fundamentally transformed decision-making processes within modern corporations. From algorithmic risk assessment and automated compliance systems to predictive analytics in boardroom strategies, AI-driven governance promises efficiency, precision, and scalability. However, this technological evolution has simultaneously produced a profound challenge commonly referred to as the black box problem wherein the internal logic, reasoning, and decision pathways of AI systems remain opaque, even to their creators. This opacity raises critical concerns regarding corporate disclosure, accountability, fiduciary duties, and stakeholder trust. Traditional corporate disclosure regimes, grounded in principles of transparency, materiality, and informed shareholder participation, are increasingly inadequate in addressing the complexities posed by AI systems. The inability of corporations to meaningfully disclose algorithmic decision-making processes undermines the foundational objectives of securities regulation, corporate governance norms, and investor protection frameworks. This paper critically examines the intersection between By tracing the historical evolution of corporate transparency norms and juxtaposing them against emerging AI governance practices, this study highlights the urgent need for rethinking disclosure standards. It explores comparative regulatory responses across jurisdictions, identifies doctrinal gaps, and proposes a multi-layered framework that incorporates mandates, algorithmic auditing, and stakeholder-centric disclosure models. This paper contends that addressing the black box problem is not merely a technological challenge but a legal and ethical imperative central to the future of corporate governance.</p>Monika Jain
Copyright (c) 2026 Journal of Corporate Governance and International Business Law
2026-05-252026-05-2592