From Relevance to Confusion: The Misapplication of Section 6 by Indian Courts the Doctrine of Res Gestae in India

The Doctrine of Res Gestae in India

Authors

  • Sanjana Rao National Law School of India University

Abstract

While the common law doctrine of res gestae was introduced as an exception to the rule against hearsay, its inherently ambiguous nature led to interpretative chaos in English jurisprudence in the 19th century. To avoid this confusion, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen drafter Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act as a rule of relevance, which is distinct from the concept of admissibility. This approach meant that facts that formed part of the same transaction would be considered relevant, irrespective of time or place. However, Indian courts have erroneously interpreted Section 6 as an embodiment of the res gestae exception- treating it as a rule of admissibility, thereby reintroducing the very problems that Stephen intended to eliminate. Through a doctrinal and case law analysis, this paper shows how courts have imposed unwarranted admissibility conditions such as contemporaneity, undermining procedural safeguards like cross-examination, and running into the issue of circular proof. It calls for a return to Stephen’s original framework, that provided a more logically coherent and legally sound understanding of Section 6.

References

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023, s 55; Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 60.

Jean Campbell, ‘Res Gestae and Hearsay Evidence’ [1972] The Modern Law Review 35, no. 5, 540–43.

Laurence H. Tribe, ‘Triangulating Hearsay’ [1974] HLR 87(5) p.957.

ibid.

Thompson v Trevanion (1693) Skinner 40.

Aveson v. Kinnaird (1805) 6 East 188.

Teper v R [1952] A.C 480, 496.

R v Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox CC 341.

Ratten v R [1972] A.C. 378; [1971] 3 W.L.R. 930 (P.C).

R. v. Andrews, [1987] AC 281.

Anurag Tiwar, ‘Rethinking Sukhar v. State of U.P.: How the Interpretation of Section 6 of Evidence Act Adopted a Thayerite Approach Rather than Stephen's’ 2022 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 83.

James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Little, Brown and Company, 1898), p. 265.

ibid.

ibid.

ibid.

Chapter 4 and 5

James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence (5th Edn., MacMillan and Company, 1887).

ibid (n 11).

Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 6.

ibid (n 17) p 4.

Indian Evidence Act, Chapter II.

Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Commentary on the Indian Evidence Act (2022, LexisNexis).

Shreya Prakash, ‘Interpretation of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act’ (2017) 1 SCC J-21.

Hadu v. State, 1950 SCC OnLine Ori 57, para 13.

Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2791.

ibid.

Ratan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) 4 SCC 161.

Yusufalli v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 147.

Sukhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1999) 9 SCC 507.

Bhairon Singh v State of MP (2009) 13 SCC 80.

State of MP v Ramesh (2011) 4 SCC 786.

ibid (n 29).

Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 6.

ibid (n 27).

ibid (n 23).

ibid.

Published

2025-08-19

How to Cite

Rao, S. (2025). From Relevance to Confusion: The Misapplication of Section 6 by Indian Courts the Doctrine of Res Gestae in India: The Doctrine of Res Gestae in India. National Journal of Criminal Law, 8(2), 106–111. Retrieved from https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/njcl/article/view/1858