The Impact of the Competition Amendment Act, 2023 on Digital Market Regulation: A Comparative and Critical Study
Keywords:
Competition Amendment Act, 2023; Digital Markets; Competition Commission of India; Platform Dominance; Ex-ante Regulation; Data Concentration; Network Effects; Algorithmic Intermediation; Gatekeeper Platforms; European Digital Markets ActAbstract
India's digital economy has evolved into a sophisticated ecosystem defined by data concentration, network dependencies, platform intermediation, and algorithmic governance. Traditional competition law, built around price-focused harm assessments and reactive enforcement models, has struggled to keep pace with these structural realities. The Competition Amendment Act, 2023 represents a significant legislative effort to modernise Indian competition law, introducing procedural tools such as settlement and commitment mechanisms alongside revised merger notification thresholds designed to capture acquisitions of nascent competitors.
This paper critically examines whether these amendments genuinely address the challenges of digital market dominance, drawing on doctrinal analysis and a comparative evaluation of the European Union's Digital Markets Act. The central argument is that while the 2023 amendment meaningfully improves procedural efficiency and enforcement velocity, it does not tackle the underlying structural causes of digital market power — namely, data asymmetries, self-preferencing conduct, and platform gatekeeping. The paper concludes by proposing calibrated regulatory measures suited to India's specific market conditions, including sector-wide market investigation powers, mandatory interoperability obligations for systemically important platforms, and enhanced institutional infrastructure for algorithmic oversight.
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Page 23
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