Journal of Capital Market and Securities Law

ENFORCEMENT DEFICIT IN INDIAN COMPETITION LAW: A Critical Analysis of Judicial Intervention and Penalty Recovery Rates (2002–2025)

Malobika Bose, Aditya Raj Singh Chauhan — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000

The Competition Act, 2002 was enacted with the transformative mandate of preventing anti-competitive practices, promoting market competition, and protecting consumer welfare. Yet two decades of enforcement reveal a critical disconnect between legislative promise and institutional reality. This paper examines the "enforcement deficit; in Indian competition law — the systematic gap between
penalties imposed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) and the amounts actually recovered — through an empirical analysis of ten landmark cases spanning 2009 to 2025. The study finds that less than 1% of total penalties imposed (approximately ₹11,069crores across the dataset) have been realized, primarily attributable to the appellate courts' entrenched practice of granting unconditional stays on penalty payments without requiring pre-deposits or financial security. Analysed through three enforcement phases — Phase I (2002–2009): Constitutional Paralysis; Phase II (2009–2017): The Stay Order Culture; and Phase III (2017–2025): Digital Markets and Procedural Attrition — the paper demonstrates that the Preamble's three-fold promise to Indian consumers has remained systematically unfulfilled across every major sector. Using the EU and UK models as comparative benchmarks, the paper proposes three targeted legislative and administrative reforms: a mandatory 25% pre-deposit requirement before appellate
admission of stay applications, a dedicated fast-track NCLAT bench for competition matters, and statutory interest on stayed penalties at the RBI repo rate plus 2%. Without such reforms, the Competition Act risks perpetuating the enforcement vacuum that rendered its predecessor, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, ineffective.

REGULATING AI-GENERATED DEEPFAKES IN INDIA’S SECURITIES MARKET: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SEBI’S ROLE AND POLICY IMPLICATION

Ansuman Barik — Tue, 27 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000

The rapid growth in artificial intelligence (AI), particularly the deep learning technologies, has significantly transformed India’s securities market. It offers a unique set of tools that assist investors and other intermediaries in financial analysis. However, there is a rise in misuse of AI-generated deep-fakes and misinformation that impersonate corporate leaders, regulators and financial experts, misleading the retail investors, manipulating the stock prices and undermining market confidence. This paper argues that the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) needs to extend its regulatory oversight beyond the registered entities' activity to encompass all forms of AI-driven financial misinformation, including deepfakes. Relying on real-world incidents across India and globally, the paper demonstrates how deepfakes or AI- generated misinformation (particularly in the securities market) have led to losses to investors and market volatility. Although jurisdictional limits, regulatory overlap with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), and free speech concerns pose challenges, the paper contends that through effective collaboration, coordinated frameworks, investor education, targeted regulation under the PFUTP Regulations and technological collaboration with the AI research entities, SEBI can effectively address these concerns. Additionally, comparative analysis from the UAE FSRA, UK FCA, US SEC and FINRA and Germany’s BaFin practices further inform a robust policy proposal. Finally, the study looks into SEBI’s proactive intervention, along with balanced inter-agency cooperation, is required to protect
the interests of the investors and market integrity in the era of AI.

From BER Opacity to BER Clarity: Doctrinal and Market Impact Analysis of SEBI’s Mutual Fund Reforms, 2026

Pakhi Jain, SANGINI SINGH — Sun, 03 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

The paper discusses the doctrinal and market implications of the reforms of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in the regulation of the expenses of mutual funds through 2026, specifically the transfer of the Total Expense Ratio (TER) model to the Base Expense Ratio (BER) model. It places the reform within the context of the Indian mutual fund industry growing rapidly as well as the growing involvement of retail investors and raises concerns on cost transparency, bundled fee models and lack of comparability under the previous TER regime. The research evaluates the legal framework of the BER system, and how it facilitated the unbundling of the managerial expenses of the brokerage, transactions and statutory charges, which contributed to the transparency and the informed decision that contributes to decision-making by the investors. It also assesses the regulatory change between price-cap based control to disclosure-based market discipline, whilst preserving scheme-specific caps to protect the interest of the investors. The paper goes further to discuss governance reforms, especially the increase in the oversight roles of trustees and evaluate the effectiveness of redressal mechanisms like SCORES. In the market, it examines the effect of these reforms on the pricing strategy, competition between asset management firms, and the confidence among
investors. It is concluded in the paper that, although BER is a major move towards transparency and accountability, its success is determined by its successful enforcement, independence of the institution, and enhancement of the financial literacy of investors.

The Impact of the Competition Amendment Act, 2023 on Digital Market Regulation: A Comparative and Critical Study

Malobika Bose, Harsh Suryavanshi — Sun, 08 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000

India's digital economy has evolved into a sophisticated ecosystem defined by data concentration, network dependencies, platform intermediation, and algorithmic governance. Traditional competition law, built around price-focused harm assessments and reactive enforcement models, has struggled to keep pace with these structural realities. The Competition Amendment Act, 2023 represents a significant legislative effort to modernise Indian competition law, introducing procedural tools such as settlement and commitment mechanisms alongside revised merger notification thresholds designed to capture acquisitions of nascent competitors.

This paper critically examines whether these amendments genuinely address the challenges of digital market dominance, drawing on doctrinal analysis and a comparative evaluation of the European Union's Digital Markets Act. The central argument is that while the 2023 amendment meaningfully improves procedural efficiency and enforcement velocity, it does not tackle the underlying structural causes of digital market power — namely, data asymmetries, self-preferencing conduct, and platform gatekeeping. The paper concludes by proposing calibrated regulatory measures suited to India's specific market conditions, including sector-wide market investigation powers, mandatory interoperability obligations for systemically important platforms, and enhanced institutional infrastructure for algorithmic oversight.

TREATY MAKING POWER; EXECUTIVE –LEGISLATURE DYNAMICS IN INDIA AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY IN GLOBAL WORLD

Shruti Verma — Wed, 24 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper examines the framework governing treaty-making in India, with particular attention to how power is distributed between the executive branch and Parliament in negotiating and ratifying international agreements. Given India's increasing involvement in global trade, foreign investment, and international cooperation, understanding the constitutional mechanics of treaty-making has become critical. The study traces how Articles 73 and 253 of the Indian Constitution establish the executive's authority to negotiate treaties while requiring parliamentary action for their implementation. Through an analysis of landmark decisions particularly the Maganbhai Ishwar Bhai Patel case and P.B. Samant v. Union of India—the paper highlights how courts have interpreted the treaty-making process, emphasizing the distinction between treaty negotiation and domestic enforcement. The work then examines bilateral investment treaties as a case study, analyzing disputes in which India has been a party to arbitration, such as the Vodafone case and the 2G spectrum controversy. These instances reveal a troubling pattern where executive autonomy in treaty negotiations, coupled with insufficient parliamentary scrutiny, has resulted in substantial financial
and diplomatic consequences for the nation. The paper concludes that while the executive's authority to enter treaties is constitutionally sound, democratic accountability and institutional checks remain inadequate, necessitating reforms that enhance parliamentary oversight, ensure transparent treaty processes, and better align international commitments with India's constitutional principles and public interest.

Corporate White-Collar Crime in India: An Empirical Analysis of Enforcement Gaps and Punitive Measures

Ashvin B. Zankat, Vanita Prajapati — Mon, 04 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Corporate white-collar crime represents a significant threat to India’s economic stability, corporate governance standards, and public trust in financial institutions. offences such as securities fraud, insider trading, accounting manipulation, bribery, and money laundering have increased in scale and complexity with the expansion of corporate activities and technological advancement. This study provides a critical and empirical evaluation of enforcement gaps within India’s legal and regulatory framework and examines the effectiveness of existing punitive measures in addressing corporate misconduct. The study examines the principal legislative frameworks regulating corporate white-collar crime, including the Companies Act, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and pertinent provisions of the Indian Penal
Code. It also assesses the roles, powers, and enforcement mechanisms of key regulatory bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), and the Enforcement Directorate (ED). Adopting a doctrinal and analytical research approach, supported by selected case studies and publicly accessible enforcement data, the research highlights several structural and procedural challenges, including delays in investigation, low conviction rates, overlapping regulatory jurisdictions, and complexities in compliance requirements. The study argues for reforms aimed at strengthening institutional capacity, improving inter-agency coordination, and streamlining enforcement procedures. It also emphasizes the need for stronger corporate compliance systems and proactive governance mechanisms within organizations. The paper concludes that addressing corporate white-collar crime in India requires a balanced regulatory approach that combines effective punitive measures withpreventive oversight, transparency, and timely enforce ment to enhance accountability and
maintain public confidence in the corporate sector.