TREATY MAKING POWER; EXECUTIVE –LEGISLATURE DYNAMICS IN INDIA AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY IN GLOBAL WORLD

Abstract

This paper examines the framework governing treaty-making in India, with particular attention to how power is distributed between the executive branch and Parliament in negotiating and ratifying international agreements. Given India's increasing involvement in global trade, foreign investment, and international cooperation, understanding the constitutional mechanics of treaty-making has become critical. The study traces how Articles 73 and 253 of the Indian Constitution establish the executive's authority to negotiate treaties while requiring parliamentary action for their implementation. Through an analysis of landmark decisions particularly the Maganbhai Ishwar Bhai Patel case and P.B. Samant v. Union of India—the paper highlights how courts have interpreted the treaty-making process, emphasizing the distinction between treaty negotiation and domestic enforcement. The work then examines bilateral investment treaties as a case study, analyzing disputes in which India has been a party to arbitration, such as the Vodafone case and the 2G spectrum controversy. These instances reveal a troubling pattern where executive autonomy in treaty negotiations, coupled with insufficient parliamentary scrutiny, has resulted in substantial financial
and diplomatic consequences for the nation. The paper concludes that while the executive's authority to enter treaties is constitutionally sound, democratic accountability and institutional checks remain inadequate, necessitating reforms that enhance parliamentary oversight, ensure transparent treaty processes, and better align international commitments with India's constitutional principles and public interest.