Mergers and Acquisitions: A Legal Examination of Corporate Restructuring and Antitrust Laws
Keywords:
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), Corporate Restructuring, Antitrust Regulation, Fiduciary Duties, Corporate Governance, Market Concentration, Cross-Border Transactions, Digital Markets, Competition LawAbstract
Mergers and acquisitions serve as critical instruments for corporate restructuring, enabling organizations to expand, innovate, and optimize operations. These transactions, however, bring intricate legal challenges, particularly in corporate governance and antitrust regulation. Fiduciary duties of directors, shareholder rights, and the potential anti-competitive effects of mergers and
acquisitions necessitate rigorous legal scrutiny. Antitrust laws, grounded in statutes, like the Sherman and Clayton Acts, aim to prevent market concentration and monopolistic practices, ensuring consumer welfare. Moreover, global antitrust regimes, such as those in the European Union, China, and India, underscore the complexities of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This paper
examines the intersection of corporate governance and antitrust regulation in mergers and acquisitions, emphasizing the evolving challenges in digital markets and globalization. A robust legal framework is essential to balance corporate innovation with competitive market structures, safeguarding economic dynamism and consumer interests.
References
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