A Rigid, Pure Tripartite Separation of the Organs of the Government and the Cameroonian Constitution: A Critical Appraisal
Keywords:
separation of powers, Constitution, Cameroon, executive, legislative, judicial, law-makingAbstract
The concept of separation of powers in its true and original sense is very rigid. In means that the three arms of the government should be completely independent and one organ should not control or interfere with the exercise of its function by another organ. Unfortunately, this principle in its strict sense has not been accepted by a large number of countries in the world because it is hematic, watertight and renders administration of the State inflexible. Practically, the delegations of powers within the administration, relation or corporation between the three organs of the government in most contemporary democracies have made the theory of separation of power in its strict sense more of a fiction, illusionary than a reality. The objective of this article is to examine the applicability of the rigid, pure tripartite separation of the organs of the government in the 2008 Cameroonian Constitution and Cameroon in general. In undertaking this analysis, the article unveils an understanding of what a tripartite separation of powers is, the principle establishing it, its importance and criticisms. Further, it brings out an application of this principle in the Cameroonian Constitution and a general appraisal of its applicability in the Constitution and the Republic of Cameroon. We adopted a doctrinal methodology, a satisfied analysis of primary and secondary data. Our findings reveal that, though the 2008 Cameroonian Constitution structurally adopts the composition of the tripartite separation of powers; the executive, the legislative and judicial powers, it is in practice operational in its liberal and not the strict sense. chiefly, in the sphere of law-making. We recommend the creation of a separate organ to reconcile the three organs where differences arise or in cases where skirmishes surface amongst them.
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