24th and 25th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971: A DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS

Abstract

In the early 1970s, India’s Parliament enacted the 24th and 25th Constitutional Amendment Acts to overturn judicial decisions that had constrained legislative power over fundamental rights. This paper examines these amendments’ genesis and effects in light of the enduring tension between individual liberties and socio-economic directives in the Constitution. We first trace the historical background of post-independence land reforms and the pivotal Golaknath ruling, which prompted Parliament to reclaim its constituent power. We then analyze each amendment’s provisions in detail and their immediate implications for property rights and the primacy of Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs). Central to this discussion is the Supreme Court’s response in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), which introduced the Basic Structure Doctrine and struck down the clauses of the 25th Amendment that attempted to oust judicial review. The paper explores how subsequent cases (e.g. Minerva Mills, I.R.
Coelho) have further defined the balance between fundamental rights and DPSPs, and how the basic structure test has become a critical safeguard. We also assess the contemporary relevance of this doctrine: it continues to shape constitutional adjudication in India and has analogues in other jurisdictions (for example, Germany’s “eternity clause” and Pakistan’s “salient features”
doctrine). By synthesizing recent scholarship and case law, this study highlights the amendments’ long-term impact on Indian democracy and their place in a global trend of entrenching core constitutional values.