Contempt of Court: Balancing Judicial Authority and Freedom of Speech

Abstract

Contempt law occupies a controversial but inevitable role in constitutional democracies. While remaining true to the duty to protect the dignity, authority, and efficiency of the judiciary, contempt jurisdiction is also a problem since it has the potential to trap the very freedom of speech and expression. In India, tension is most sharply experienced, given the broad sweep of contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 129, and 215 of the Constitution. Although jurisdiction over contempt serves to sustain public faith in the administration of justice, abuse has long been challenged as gagging healthy dissent and democratic accountability. This is a critical analysis of the Indian law of contempt of court specifically relating to the offence of "scandalizing the court," which continues to have statutory definition despite repeal in the majority of common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom. Comparative and doctrinal in nature, the study examines to what extent the Indian judiciary has applied the boundaries of fair criticism in seminal cases such as E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T.N. Nambiar, In Re Arundhati Roy, and In Re Prashant Bhushan. The article also compares India with the United States, in which the First Amendment provides robust protection of judges' criticism, and the United Kingdom, whose reform has restricted contempt so that it cannot be abused. Through inter-disciplinary dialogue with scholarly writing, judicial decisions, and comparative analysis, the article seeks to highlight the imperatives towards reorienting contempt jurisprudence in India. It seeks a balance that retains judicial discretion but without polluting constitutional imaginations of free speech, openness, and democratic accountability. It concludes by proposing reforms that would balance deference to the courts and embracing legitimate criticism and hence fortify the rule of law and democratic discussion.