WESTMINSTER MODEL SHADOW CABINET IN INDIA

A COMPARATIVE POLITICO-LEGAL ANALYSIS OF INDIAN & UK SCENARIO

Abstract

Due to a single-party government with an overwhelming majority in the Indian parliament, several bills have been passed without much debate in the previous decade. Ministerial research quality has deteriorated, and there is no opposition party to discuss this as no party has the required number of seats. Recent bills, including the surrogacy bill, the RTI amendment, etc., were approved without
much debate. Private members of parliament are rarely informed about the government's plans, resulting in absenteeism and frequent walkouts. The Prime Minister and his cabinet have undisputed authority over the legislature, whilst accusations of bias against the President and the apex court complicate the issue. This weakening of checks and balances has a negative impact on India's public governance system and Rule of Law and contradicts Dicey's idea of "predominance of legal spirit." Thus, there is a need to establish novel kinds of counterbalances, and several parliaments across the globe have proposed a solution: shadow cabinets. The current study analyses the socio-political development and constitutional efficiency of shadow cabinets in nations such as the United Kingdom. It also focuses on the procedural modifications required to execute these rules in India, and the reasons for its failure in Indian state governments. It suggests that shadow cabinets enhance performance efficiency, research quality, bill presentation frameworks, and agendas debated by cabinet ministers. Furthermore, it concludes that the system of checks and balances shall be revived, the Rule of Law be strengthened, and institutional morality internalized in the Indian parliament.