The Proportionality Test Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Ghana

Authors

  • Peter Atudiwe Atupare UNIVERSITY OF GHANA SCHOOL OF LAW, LEGON, GHANA
  • Abdul Baasit Aziz Bamba

Keywords:

proportionality test, jurisprudence, constitutionalism, constitutional adjudication

Abstract

This paper does not promise any comprehensive evaluation of the worth of the Supreme Court of Ghana, especially as it relates to the positive engagement of the court with all legal principles. The purpose of this article is to explore the idea of a more progressive theory of legal analysis in respect of the proportionality principle. Although the Court's formalistic, rule-based explanation for the proportionality principle needs strengthening, and its application in specific instances may be questioned, the principle itself is not the product of illegitimate judicial activism. Inherent in this principle, we will argue, is a legal culture of justification reasonably required for the protection of constitutional rights in the administrative decision-making process. On the account of this, we claim that the application of the proportionality test constitutes a soft constitutionalism principle to safeguard rights in administrative justice actions.

Author Biography

Abdul Baasit Aziz Bamba

Dr. Abdul Baasit Aziz Bamba is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Ghana School of Law, where he lectures on a broad range of courses including Law and Society, Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Human Rights Law, Natural Resources Law, and Investment and International Commercial, Arbitration.

References

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Ibid 156; See also Cottier et al op.cit (n 27) 18

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Ibid 17

Vicki op.cit (n 87) 3100

In some jurisdictions, particularly in Canada, the balancing test is often set aside and not employed,

even as a measure of last resort. Critics of this view argue that the central question, namely, the

'balancing question' holds greater significance, and that it is frequently obscured or inadequately

addressed within the steps of the Oakes test. This omission, they assert, undermines the clarity and

effectiveness of the adjudicative process. It is preferred however, that this critical inquiry should be

explicitly reserved for the final stage of the analysis, where it can receive the focused attention it

merits. The earlier steps, it is believed, should serve primarily to eliminate weak justificatory

arguments, thus refining and narrowing the scope of the ultimate evaluation. This method,

essentially, ensures that the balancing of values is both transparent and methodologically sound in

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[1997-98] 1 GLR 611

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid at 629-630

Ibid.

Ibid. at 630.

Ibid at 630

Ibid at 635

Ibid.

Ibid at 635

[2010] SCGLR 575

Ibid.

Ibid at 609

Ibid.

Ibid at 609-610

Ibid. at 610

[2017] GHASC 18.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

[2019] GHASC 29.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Beatty op.cit (n 38)

[2022] GHASC 99.

Revenue Administration Act, 201(Act 915).

Afrifa v. Ghana Revenue Authority op.cit (n 133) 10

Ibid 12

Ibid 13

Ibid 14

Ibid 8

Ibid 17

Ibid 10-22

Ibid. 27-34

Richard Amo-hene v Ghana Revenue Authority & 2 Others Infra (n 149)18

Ibid 15-23

Ibid. 31-33

Ibid 25

High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2004 (C.I 47), Order 54, rule 4

Ibid.

[2022] GHASC 103 (30 November 2022).

Ibid 1-12

Ibid 1-12

Afrifa v. Ghana Revenue Authority op.cit (n 133) 15

Ibid 11

Ibid 23

[2024] GHASC 303

Ibid 64

Ibid 73-75

Civil and Local Government Staff Association of Ghana [CLOSAG] v The Attorney-General

& Others op.cit (n 124).

Osae v. Food and Drugs Authority op.cit (n 155) 56.

Published

2026-01-09

How to Cite

Atupare, P. A. ., & Aziz Bamba, A. B. . (2026). The Proportionality Test Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Ghana. Journal of Constitutional Law and Jurisprudence, 9(1), 39–60. Retrieved from https://lawjournals.celnet.in/index.php/Jolj/article/view/1669