An Analytical Reconsideration of the Separation of Power: A System of Check and Balance in India
Keywords:
Constitution of India, political philosophers, Montesquieu, political landscape, political actors, the judiciary, and civil societyAbstract
The Indian political system envisages the concept of the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. It is rooted in the Constitution of India, which was adopted in 1950 and draws inspiration from various sources, including the Constitution of the United States and the ideas of political philosophers like Montesquieu. An analytical reconsideration of these concepts is necessary to comprehend how these ideas function in the Indian context. Despite the constitutional framework, there have been instances of concentration of power and a lack of effective checks and balances, especially during periods of political instability or when one political party dominates the political landscape. The role of money in politics and the influence of special interest groups can also undermine the system of checks and balances. While the Indian Constitution provides a robust framework for these principles, their effectiveness in practice depends on the commitment of political actors, the judiciary, and civil society to uphold and protect them. This paper delves into the principle of separation of powers and how it relates to the principle of checks and balances from a jurisprudential lens. The paper briefly discusses the historical background, origin and how this principle has been manifested in India, the nature and degree of checks each branch exercises over the others, and broadly, the Indian legislative schemes on separation of powers. It views the separation of power from an international perspective and the embodiment of the doctrine in the United States of America and the United Kingdom.
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